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ABSTRACT
A rich literature argues that interorganizational networks foster learning and coordinated adaptation
among their constituents, but embedded ties between organizations are not ubiquitous. What
explains this heterogeneity? Acknowledging the influence of agency relationships within
organizations can help refine the scope of embeddedness arguments. This idea is explored in an in-
depth qualitative examination of sourcing practices in drug development. The outsourcing of central
laboratory services is characterized by repeated interactions, relationship-specific investments, and
fine-grained information transfer between buyers and suppliers. In contrast, embedded relationships
with contract research organizations have failed to materialize, despite the repeated efforts of
exchange partners. Drawing on fieldwork conducted at six pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms,
I explain why outsourcing deals take the form of embedded relationships in the first setting, and of
seemingly inefficient spot contracts in the second setting. The evidence suggests that the structure
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Over the past decade, sociologists have drawn attention to network forms of organi-
zation, including alliances, joint-ventures, and long-term supply relationships (Granovetter,
1985; Powell, 1990; Podolny and Page, 1998). Work in this tradition has produced fasci-
nating ethnographic evidence, which, at ﬁrst glance, presents a puzzle for the purported
economic eﬃciency of markets (Uzzi, 1997). Common themes in this stream of research
include the assertion that structures between organizations do not lay neatly on a market-
hierarchy continuum, but operate in a distinct embedded logic of exchange (Uzzi, 1996); that
networks are shaped by the extant social structure (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999); and that,
although they expose participating ﬁrms to hold-ups, networks promote ﬁrm performance
through interﬁrm resource pooling, cooperation and coordinated adaptation (Powell et al.,
1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Helper et al., 1999).
While this literature has undoubtedly enriched our understanding of ﬁrms and other
economic institutions, the scope of embeddedness arguments is ill-deﬁned: if relational gov-
ernance enhances organizational performance, why are arms-length relationships between
ﬁrms so prevalent? In this paper, I contend that ﬁrms’ internal organizational arrangements
may forestall the emergence of embedded relationships between ﬁrms, even when exchange
partners perceive that adopting relational modes of governance would yield substantial ben-
eﬁts. The argument brings together the interorganizational networks literature with a much
older sociological tradition dealing with issues of trust and cooperation inside organizations
(Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1955; Dalton, 1959).
Two activities often outsourced by pharmaceutical ﬁrms — the coordination of clini-
cal trials and the provision of laboratory services — provide the paper’s empirical back-
drop. Since the mid-1980s, Contract Research Organizations (CROs) have partly replaced
the in-house labor force necessary to coordinate and monitor clinical trials. Because the
data-production activities performed by CRO employees are highly interdependent with the
knowledge-production activities conducted by employees of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, clinical
development outsourcing is precisely the type of setting where one would expect embedded
1ties to be beneﬁcial. However, embedded buyer-supplier relationships have not materialized,
despite the repeated eﬀorts of both upstream and downstream ﬁrms. In contrast, relational
governance prevails in the outsourcing of central laboratory services. Relationships between
pharmaceutical ﬁrms and central laboratories (which analyze and perform tests of patients’
blood or tissue samples, an important intermediate input into the clinical trials process) are
characterized by repeated interactions, relationship-speciﬁc investments, and ﬁne-grained
information transfer. Using this second setting to rule out a number of alternative explana-
tions, I set out to explain the reasons behind the failure of embeddedness in the ﬁrst setting.
The empirical exercise relies on ethnographic ﬁeldwork conducted at six pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, supplemented by telephone interviews with personnel of ten diﬀerent suppliers.
The evidence suggests that the presence of embedded ties between ﬁrms is inﬂuenced
by the nature of labor market institutions within ﬁrms. Whereas central lab employees are
highly trained, organized in self-directed workteams, and have relatively long tenure, CROs
pay low wages, invest minimally in training, and attract inexperienced staﬀ prone to “job
hopping.” It is also possible to compare CRO staﬀ with pharmaceutical company employees
performing exactly the same activity, since pharmaceutical ﬁrms rely simultaneously on
insiders and outsiders to coordinate and monitor clinical trials. There again, suppliers run
“data-production sweatshops” that stand in sharp contrast with buyers’ “posthierarchical”
organizations and their attendant set of human resource practices (Zuboﬀ, 1988; Osterman,
1994). CROs’ Taylorist approach to the organization of work undermines the embedding
process because of its exclusive reliance on “hard” measures of performance, its fostering
of job designs inimical to teamwork, and the hierarchical constraints it puts on information
ﬂows. In turn, arms-length contracting between ﬁrms raises suppliers’ returns to structuring
the employment relationship along Taylorist lines. This vicious circle results from a self-
fulﬁlling failure of expectations. Breaking this vicious circle is especially diﬃcult in clinical
development, as seemingly ineﬃcient spot contracts with CROs buﬀer pharmaceutical ﬁrms’
employees against the large shocks that often aﬀect the drug development pipeline.
Consistent with previous research (Axelrod, 1984; Heide and Miner, 1992; Baker et al.,
2002; MacMillan and Woodruﬀ, 1999), I also ﬁnd that the expected length of the relation-
2ship inﬂuences the formation of embedded ties. Anticipating that a relationship may be
terminated in the future through no fault of its own, a supplier will hesitate to make speciﬁc
investments — for example by dedicating teams to a particular client. Since the demand for
clinical monitoring services tends to be lumpier and more unpredictable than the demand
for laboratory services, the “shadow of the future” looms smaller in the ﬁrst setting than
in the second, thus providing an additional reason for the dearth of “hand-in-glove” supply
relationships between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and CROs. While intuitively appealing, this
explanation is not entirely compelling; in principle, interorganizational cooperation could be
maintained if information about exchange partners was monitored with enough accuracy and
sanctions administered by the “community” of pharmaceutical ﬁrms through a multilateral
reputation mechanism (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Kandori, 1992). Institutions that facilitate
the informal sharing of information about suppliers do exist in the pharmaceutical industry.
Yet, embedded ties fail to emerge because the usefulness of this information is contingent
on CROs’ rate of employee turnover. In keeping with the paper’s overall argument, the
shadow cast by the expectation of future interactions on the strength of interorganizational
ties depends on the structure of internal labor markets.
2 Agents, Agency, and Embeddedness
The past decade has seen remarkable advances in social scientists’ understanding of net-
work forms of organizations, loosely deﬁned as “any collection of actors that pursue repeated,
enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate or-
ganizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange”
(Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59). Organizational sociologists have both documented the
prevalence of such arrangements and marshaled an impressive amount of evidence point-
ing to the superiority of such “embedded” modes of exchange over the anonymous market
transactions that are the staple of textbook economic theory. This line of inquiry also has
been successful in buttressing the claim that networks do not constitute hybrids between
the polar organizational forms of markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1985 and 1996), but
3deﬁne a distinct logic of exchange (Powell, 1987). In particular, the simultaneous use of
price, authority and trust as control mechanisms appears to be relatively frequent in on-
going interorganizational exchanges — even in settings characterized by high transactions
costs (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1990).
One overarching weakness of this literature is that its theoretical scope is ill-deﬁned. As
acknowledged by Podolny and Page in their review, we may have a good understanding
of why economic actors might want to structure exchange in networks, but we have less
understanding of why they often fail to do so. Yet, a theory of the network form needs a
reliable answer to the question “why aren’t all interﬁrm exchanges structured as relational
contracts?” just like transaction costs economics, as part of its theoretical apparatus, needs
to reckon with the question “why don’t all exchanges take place in a single ﬁrm?”
One might argue that framing the question above as a puzzle betrays a functional mode
of reasoning according to which institutions originate in order to solve economic problems
(Granovetter, 1992). As past research has pointed out, it may be hazardous to presume that
embeddedness can be engineered, since the social ties that constitute its very fabric require
aﬀect and empathy, qualities that cannot be summoned at will (Ingram and Roberts, 2000).
This objection, reasonable as it may be, cannot provide a complete explanation for the
institutional heterogeneity that even the most casual form of observation makes plain. In
the automobile industry, for instance, the Japanese system of interorganizational relations
was successfully transplanted to US plants owned by Japanese manufacturers, despite the
legacy of traditional Fordist organizational practices prevalent in the “transplant corridor” of
the lower Midwest and upper South (Florida and Kenney, 1991). Subsequently, this system
was gradually adopted by domestic American ﬁrms (Helper and Sako, 1995). In particular,
Chrysler appears to have been able to emulate — albeit with a long lag — “cooperative”
supplier-management practices, despite a previous history of contentious relationships (Dyer,
1996).
I propose a distinct explanation that acknowledges the role of agents within the organiza-
tions constituting the network, along with the inﬂuence of the agency relationships to which
4they are part. Organization theory has only recently begun to grapple with the mechanisms
through which individual-level action aﬀects interorganization-level outcomes (Zaheer et al.,
1998). In part, this reﬂects that much empirical research on interorganizational networks
has focused on entrepreneurial ﬁrms, a setting in which representing a participant ﬁrm as a
unitary node within a network does not result in the loss of crucial information.1 A method-
ological bias might also be at play: conﬂating a ﬁrm’s hierarchy into a node on a network map
enables the application of traditional sociometric analysis to the study of interorganizational
networks (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).
Recognizing that it is individuals as members of organizations who trust — rather than
organizations themselves — has led scholars to take the natural ﬁrst step of focusing on the
role of “boundary spanners” in creating, maintaining, and dissolving interorganizational ties.
For example, professional transitions for these individuals is often associated with a higher
hazard of dissolution for the ties they helped broker (Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2002). But
this evidence comes from the advertising industry, a setting in which business relationships
tend to be highly personalized. In a more typical industrial setting, this study focuses less
on the inﬂuence of individual agents than on the type of employment relationships prevailing
inside the ﬁrms to which they belong.
To lay out the argument, I use the following rhetorical device. I focus on a sector of
the economy — clinical development in the pharmaceutical industry — in which exchange
characteristics appear at ﬁrst glance indistinguishable from other settings in which embedded
supply relationships have emerged and performed well. I show that such relationships have
nonetheless failed to materialize, despite repeated eﬀorts of both buyers and suppliers. I
set out on a qualitative exploration of the root cause behind this failure. The analysis is
made more persuasive by the comparison with a closely-related activity — central laboratory
services — which shares many characteristics of clinical development but also diﬀers from it
in a few important (and relevant) respects.
1For example, Uzzi (1997: 38) argues that an advantage of studying garment ﬁrms is that CEOs “are
involved in all key aspects of the business and consequently have ﬁrst-hand knowledge of the ﬁrm’s strategy
and administrative activities.”
53 Data and Methods
I conducted ﬁeld and ethnographic analysis at six pharmaceutical and biotechnology
ﬁrms in the United States, focusing exclusively on two important activities performed in
the course of drug development: the coordination of clinical trials, and the processing and
analysis of patient samples in central laboratories. The choice of setting was prompted
by a discussion with two ex-CRO employees who had described vividly the contrast be-
tween human resource practices prevailing at their former employer with those prevailing
in their current job. Data collection followed grounded theory building techniques (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967), although the analysis is not framed as an exercise in hypothesis testing.
Rather, it aims to re-interpret existing theory by drawing attention to important tendencies
that have previously been ignored (Vallas, 2003).
The market for clinical development exhibits a two-mode structure, with clear role dif-
ferentiation between buyers (pharmaceutical sponsors of clinical trials) and suppliers (CROs
and central labs). Therefore, I complemented the ﬁeld study with telephone interviews with
personnel of ten suppliers (seven CROs and three central labs) so as to avoid providing a
one-sided account. The selection of cases followed theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989).
As is often the case in ﬁeld research, I was constrained by the need to gain access, a time-
consuming process requiring the negotiation of conﬁdentiality agreements with each research
site. Nonetheless, as is displayed in Table 1, the set of ﬁrms studied is quite diverse in terms
of geographic dispersion, size, age, and breadth of product portfolio. Similarly, both small
and large ﬁrms were included in the sample of suppliers.
While in the ﬁeld, I was attentive to the need of interviewing staﬀ at various levels of
responsibilities and “hands-on interaction” with CROs and central laboratories. I system-
atically interviewed the Vice President for Clinical Research (except in one ﬁrm) as well
as employees in charge of negotiating outsourcing contracts, but I also insisted on talking
at length with project managers, clinical data managers, and clinical monitors involved on
a daily basis in projects contracted out to CROs.2 In the course of performing telephone
2Throughout the paper, the terms clinical study, clinical trial, and project are synonymous.
6interviews with suppliers, the point of contact was the business development manager, but
for the three largest suppliers, I also interviewed a project manager, the human resource
manager, and one to two employees from the rank and ﬁle.
I made initial contact with outsourcing managers using a variety of channels: an industry
conference, an independent consultant, and two dissertation advisers’ industry contacts. I
introduced myself as a doctoral student writing his dissertation on the outsourcing practices
of pharmaceutical ﬁrms in drug development. In-depth interviews were open-ended, lasting
from a half-hour to three hours, with one hour being the norm. In ﬁve of the six ﬁrms, I
spent three days on-site interviewing personnel, and in one ﬁrm, I was privy to a project-
team meeting. These trips enabled me to gather ﬁrst-hand ethnographic data on human-
resource practices and the nature of buyer-supplier relationships. After asking permission
from subjects, I recorded each interview using a pocket-size tape recorder. The recordings
were transcribed within a few days after each site visit so as to maximize accuracy. Field
observations and anecdotes were separately jotted down in a spiral notebook.
The study proceeded in ﬁve stages. Stage one involved open-ended, moderately directive
interviews. I conducted interviews carefully so that natural alternative interpretations of the
facts could be examined, probing, for example, the existence of social ties between buyers’
and suppliers’ employees. I used nondirective items to probe sensitive issues, for example
“Do you have further examples of this?” or “Can you give me a more detailed description of
what happened?” When respondents expressed strong negative feelings about their suppliers
(a fairly common occurrence), I usually pressed them by asking why they thought these
suppliers were used at all. The Appendix lists the interview items.
In the second stage, I began to organize the data according to a crude and preliminary
working framework. A “cross-site display,” shown in Table 2, indicates the frequency and
weighting of data across cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Armed with this understanding
of buyers’ perspective, I then proceeded to interview suppliers on the phone in stage three.
Since one of my objectives was to compare and contrast buyers’ and suppliers’ perceptions
7regarding the nature of their relationships, I was careful not to lead the interview with the
insights I had gained in stage two.
In the fourth stage, the analysis of the evidence proceeded by iteration. A given narrative
suggested a model that, when explicated, had implications for the structure of relationships
within which the events occurred. Those implications forced me to reconsider the narrative
and then to reevaluate the extent to which key elements of the narrative lay outside the
proposed theory. This inductive approach challenged both the evidence about the event of
interest and theories that structured that evidence (Bates et al., 2000).
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal stage focused on gaining construct and external validity. This was
achieved in two ways. First, I conferred with ﬁve managers from companies who did not
participate in the study at the leading industry conference. Tellingly, none of these managers
told me that he or she had learned anything new from the study. Instead, they said I had
presented in a more systematic form inchoate ideas they held about the structure of supply
relationships in their industry. I take this as evidence that what follows is not a mere artifact
of the selection of ﬁrms. Second, I triangulated the qualitative ﬁnding of the absence of
embedded ties with CROs using data from FastTrack, Inc. Since 1991, this company has
gathered clinical development information from subscribing pharmaceutical companies in
order to help them better. As a result, I believe the chance of response bias is low, given the
sample’s breadth and the cross-checking of interview and archival data.
4 Engineering Embeddedness: Successes and Failures
I begin by describing the two research settings in some detail. In doing so, I establish
a number of facts upon which the theory-building exercise is grounded. First, both the
coordination of clinical trials and central lab services appear to constitute auspicious settings
for the development of embedded ties between buyers and suppliers, in light of extant theory.
Second, in both cases buyers and suppliers attempted to develop such ties. Third, only in
the latter setting were they successful in doing so.
8In order to gain regulatory approval for market introduction, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) requires that a pharmaceutical company provide substantial evidence of a
drug’s eﬀectiveness through adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations. Although
the details of these requirements have evolved over the years, proof of eﬀectiveness must be
provided by the results of randomized control trials. Running these trials eﬀectively and
documenting them to the satisfaction of the FDA is an enormously complex and costly task
(Mathieu, 1997; Spilker, 1991). I focus here on two of the activities that are central to suc-
cess: the coordination of clinical trials and the processing and analysis of patient samples in
central laboratories. Such a narrow focus is important since comparisons between types of
supply relationships are usually confounded by task heterogeneity. Controlling for this kind
of environmental variation appears necessary to draw inferences from qualitative data.
Until the mid-1980s, ﬁrms relied on an in-house labor force of clinical monitors to recruit,
coordinate, and supervise the large number of investigators needed to conduct experimental
human studies. Proper monitoring of clinical investigations is an integral part of a set
of rules known as “Good Clinical Practices” that are mandated and enforced by regulatory
authorities. While monitoring and clinical data management are unglamorous tasks, they are
critical to the extent that skimping on data quality may jeopardize the scientiﬁc credibility
of a new drug application and, more importantly, damage the reputation of the sponsor with
regulatory agencies.
Since the mid-1980s, these duties have been outsourced to a new breed of specialized
subcontractors called Contract Research Organizations (CROs), but vertical disintegration
rarely applies to the totality of a ﬁrm’s portfolio of projects (Azoulay, 2003b). As a result,
the coordination and monitoring of clinical trials provides an example of the “plural form”
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989), whereby distinct organizational control mechanisms are operated
simultaneously for the same function by the same ﬁrm. Over time, CROs have extended the
range of services they provide to include protocol design, biostatistical analysis, and report
writing. The contract research industry was until recently growing at the brisk pace of 20%
per year, and it is estimated that up to one ﬁfth of overall pharmaceutical development
9budgets are captured by these independent ﬁrms, representing slightly less than $7 billion
in 2001 (Mathieu, 2003).
Sociologists have long noted that organizations must perform their technical work inter-
nally and present an image of ordered, rational procedure to external parties (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977). In light of the importance of non-market actors in drug development — such
as regulators, patient lobbying groups, and elected oﬃcials — it would be natural to con-
jecture that outsourcing reﬂects ﬁrms’ need to insulate themselves from the conduct of the
clinical trials process, so as to mitigate conﬂicts of interest. This does not appear to be the
case. First, CROs do not shield pharmaceutical ﬁrms from responsibility for the integrity
of the studies they sponsor (DHHS, 1997). In this regard, these suppliers are very diﬀerent
from accounting ﬁrms, who can be held liable for the accuracy of their audits. Second,
pharmaceutical ﬁrms do not appeal to the certiﬁcation rationale to justify their decision
to outsource. Third, FDA medical examiners are often unaware whether a study they are
reviewing has been outsourced, and to the extent that they become aware, tend to view
externally-monitored studies with more skepticism, due to CROs’ “sweatshop” reputation.3
Rather than the need for impartial certiﬁcation, clinical development outsourcing reﬂects
pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ concern for the cohesion of their internal labor markets, as explained
later in this paper.
The processing and analysis of biological samples constitutes the study’s second setting;
these activities take place in large facilities called central laboratories, whose emergence is
a relatively recent phenomenon. In the 1990s, central labs progressively replaced smaller
laboratories generally located in academic medical centers, for the FDA had come to expect
greater reliability and consistency in measurement than the decentralized model allowed.
With a focus on automation and real-time access to data, these suppliers might analyze
large batches of diagnostic kits, extract DNA from patient samples, or provide storage facil-
ities. This activity diﬀers from the conduct and monitoring of clinical trials in that it has
traditionally been fully outsourced by pharmaceutical ﬁrms. It is also much more capital-
3Personal communication with Dr. Murray Lumpkin, Deputy Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evalu-
ation Research.
10intensive. However, these activities are similar along a number of important dimensions.
First, the labor force is predominantly composed of non-professionals (clinical monitors in
the ﬁrst case; laboratory technicians in the second case). Second, relationships with CROs
and central laboratories tend to be managed by the same set of people inside pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. Figure 1 provides a summary schema of the organization of the clinical trials process.
4.1 Clinical Development: Auspicious Setting for the Develop-
ment of Embedded Ties?
In many respects, clinical development resembles other economic activities that have
been fertile ground for the emergence of “hand-in-glove” buyer-supplier relationships (Uzzi,
1997; Helper et al., 2000). This is not to say that extant theory predicts this should be the
case here as well. Rather, past research would tend to support the more modest claim that
contracting out an information-intensive activity through arms-length ties creates a number
of hazards; complex contracts can mimic formal aspects of hierarchy, but cannot secure
consummate — as opposed to perfunctory — cooperation from employees (Williamson, 1975;
Stinchcombe, 1990).
Both settings diﬀer from spot markets because they often involve ongoing interactions
between the two contractual parties in the implementation process. They share a number
of other characteristics. Consider ﬁrst the provision of central laboratory services. Central
Labs provide a critical input into clinical development whose quality is deeply dependent
on the strength of the relationship between buyers and suppliers. One outsourcing manager
explained:
“The same equipment is used throughout the study. When we ﬁle for approval, we do
not have to explain why this or that value looked out of range. And we have invested
a lot in IT to tailor our systems to capture data from their machines remotely, in real
time.”
Another one suggested:
“The lab must have specimen collection kits ready for the study sites to begin the trial.
Because we tend to change study protocols early and often, sometimes up to the 11th
11hour, they often need to change, and reprogram, and reprogram. This means having
additional staﬀ on hand to absorb these last-minute amendments. Although labs are
capital-intensive, the diﬀerentiator is labor. There is a pool of people that program the
database and work with the investigators. Those people know what we expect and what
are our processes, and how to translate this knowledge into a smooth operational ride.”
The purported beneﬁts of embeddedness are relevant in the second setting as well. Clinical
study services require investments in speciﬁc human capital, rely on coordinated adaptation,
and are made more eﬀective by the transfer of ﬁne-grained information and joint-problem
solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997).
Speciﬁc human capital. In clinical development, investments in human capital present
both ﬁrm- and drug-speciﬁc characteristics. Cooperation among team members was deeply
grounded in the particular routines used by the ﬁrm to integrate knowledge into collective
action. Most pharmaceutical ﬁrms developed and reﬁned processes that ensured compliance
with regulatory guidelines, but this client-speciﬁc body of knowledge was rarely written
down. Instead, it circulated among monitors as stories and snippets of advice. As a result,
clients incurred non-trivial switching costs when selecting new suppliers. A clinical operations
manager in one of the larger ﬁrm explained that
“If you work with a CRO, and they do a nice job for you, and they hit the milestones you
wanted, why on earth would you look somewhere else? Because there are growing pains
associated with setting up these relationships. If I go and work with a new CRO, I need
them to understand the way I work and what I expect; moreover, I need to understand
how they work. It’s never easy. The ﬁrst 6-8 months working with a new CRO are
awful, because you are constantly stepping on each others’ toes and miscommunicating.”
Performance (generally measured by speed of trial execution, subject to a quality con-
straint for the data collected) was also heavily inﬂuenced by employees’ ability to learn from
the previous studies and apply this knowledge creatively during subsequent studies. Very
often, this knowledge was contextual and hence not easily codiﬁed or rationalized:
“There are all the things that you have done but not fully documented, and you just
wish you could pull a cassette out of the head of [our] project manager and implant it
in the head of [the CRO’s] project manager.”
12Joint problem-solving and coordinated adaptation. Drug development is a sequential
process: costs are additive, beneﬁts are received only at the termination of the project, and
the possibility of discontinuing development is ever present. Moreover, ﬁrms operate in a
tightly regulated environment in which the boundaries between operational and scientiﬁc
issues are constantly shifting and being redrawn under the pressure of external stakeholders.
Because the “patent clock” of experimental compounds starts ticking shortly before entering
the clinic, the challenge faced by pharmaceutical companies is to collect the information
necessary to take the crucial “go/no-go” decisions about project cancellation in the short-
est possible amount of time. This requires close coordination of scientiﬁc and operational
decision making, which is generally best achieved by putting “heavyweight” product devel-
opment teams in charge of speciﬁc projects (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Itoh, 1994). The
team structure is designed to encourage ongoing cooperation and information pooling among
team members, who represent diﬀerent functional areas. Therefore, one would expect teams
to span organizational boundaries; this expectation was shared by respondents. One clinical
team manager claimed that he would “work best with CROs that felt like they were part of
the team, that brought up issues, that came up with suggestions.” Another added: “If I have
an enrollment problem, the CRO should be the ﬁrst to bring it to my attention... I would
expect a CRO to have expertise and creativity, to be proactive, and to take ownership of most
organizational issues.”
Fine-grained information transfer. During the course of a clinical study, much useful
information is generated locally by clinical investigators, either through direct interaction
with patients or by purposeful analysis. This information — which may pertain to both
the operational and scientiﬁc aspects of the study — is at risk of being “stuck” if it is not
adequately captured in the study protocol. Since monitors are in contact with the complete
set of doctors participating in a clinical study, they can bring information and problem-
solving capabilities together at a single locus (von Hippel, 1998); this sometimes results in the
production of idiosyncratic knowledge about experimental compounds and the diseases they
are intended to treat. The Vice President for Clinical Aﬀairs at a biotechnology company
13shared with me the experience of a clinical study team that illustrates the importance of
“soft” information.
To perform a clinical trial for a drug used to treat pulmonary hypertension (a life-
threatening condition), this company recruited investigators from academic medical centers
and private clinics. Puzzled by a very slow patient enrollment into the study, the clinical
team leader asked the monitors to investigate and identify the root-cause of the problem.
The monitors noticed a pattern in the patient enrollment statistics: the for-proﬁt centers
were lagging far behind the academic centers. Upon further investigation, the monitors
determined that the delays were caused by the requirement that patients undergo a lung
biopsy to determine their eligibility. In academic centers, this test could be performed and
the results provided to patients on the same day, while in the private clinics, conﬁrmation
of eligibility was postponed for several days because of the need to ship biopsy samples to
an outside laboratory for analysis. With this information, the study team amended the
protocol to substitute a type of specialized X-ray for the biopsy requirement. The ability
to perform the screening of patients in a single day resulted in a much improved enrollment
process. Interestingly, this team was not composed of CRO employees, but of in-house staﬀ.
A project manager in the same company added:
“An outsider should not be able to tell if a clinical monitor works for the company
or the CRO. They are the eyes and ears of the company in the ﬁeld. They write
trip reports. They ﬁnd out things that are going wrong, operational or medical. For
example, the case report form might be set up poorly to gather the information. You
need to read between the lines of the CRF. If there is something unexpected, if you’re
not out there ﬁnding out, you are going to miss it. Their job is to ﬁnd out why a site
is not recruiting well, for example. Is another company competing for patients? Is it
the inclusion/exclusion criteria? Is it that the sites are not paid enough?”
4.2 Have Embedded Relationships Emerged?
As one might expect from this description, embedded ties appear to be a feature of the
relationships between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and their Central Labs. Five of the six ﬁrms
in the sample had succeeded in establishing relational contracts with a limited number of
Central Labs. As recounted by the outsourcing manager of a large biotechnology ﬁrm:
14“Partnerships have worked with Central Labs. We get dedicated program managers that
are ahead of the curve. The service level has gone up, costs have gone down, and they
are getting more business...When we started that initiative, there were 7 or 8 labs in
use. Each team had a preference, and moreover, they were quite likely to terminate
the relationship with a lab after one project, switch to another lab, work with them for
one or two projects, then terminate that lab because things were not working. From my
standpoint, there was an absence of shared understanding and expectations. The teams
did not realize what the labs needed to be successful. The hardest part was to build
the trust in the initial projects. Once those had been successful, it was like a positive
reinforcement loop. We are now doing 80% of our lab business with a single lab...”
In another ﬁrm, the manager in charge of laboratory services explained his approach in
the following terms:
“One of the things we did going into it was to tell the lab that we were not going to
guarantee a certain amount of business because we couldn’t do it, the teams needed to
have a certain amount of choice. But what we guaranteed is that we would only work
with two labs. Their senior management believed us. That’s a limited free market.
They would be competing within a smaller pool.”
In contrast, these six ﬁrms did not provide a single instance of a relationship with a CRO
that could be characterized as “embedded.” The diﬀerences between the two settings is all
the more puzzling because the same individuals were in charge of managing relationships
with CROs and Central Laboratories in all six ﬁrms. The transactional orientation of supply
relationships manifested itself during the contract bidding phase, in the oversight practices
used by pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and in the lack of enduring relationships between buyers and
suppliers.
Competitive bidding appeared to be an accepted norm, with buyers usually organizing
a “dog and pony show” where three or four CROs competed for one project. Most out-
sourcing managers lamented practicing “tactical outsourcing” or “just-in-time purchasing
of CRO services,” which they viewed as expensive and ineﬃcient. Contract negotiations
were often protracted, with suppliers attempting to limit buyer’s ability to introduce fu-
ture modiﬁcations, and buyers striving to maintain ﬂexibility. Said one clinical department
manager: “They want a protocol signed with your blood before they start working on a case
report form.” Of course, the unpredictability of ongoing development projects made contract
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the words of a project manager: “They try to milk you when they have you over a barrel
because your trial is running.”
Employee assignment was a signiﬁcant bone of contention between buyers and suppli-
ers. Outsourcing involved relinquishing a key decision right to CROs: the ability to match
particular employees to speciﬁc projects. The identity, skill-level, and job design of CRO
employees could not be easily contracted upon. In the words of an outsourcing manager:
“CROs keep giving us bad people to choose from, and there is nothing I can do about it.”
Others highlighted instances where a team of seasoned veterans had been promised by a
CRO, but “rookies” had been substituted for the “A-team” at the last minute. This “bait
and switch” tactic appeared to be relatively common. Formal contracts did not solve the
issue because buyers — or a court of law — could not distinguish voluntary turnover from
opportunistic reassignment to another client.
The oversight practices of pharmaceutical sponsors were also indicative of a generalized
distrust between buyers and suppliers. On this point, a clinical project manager said: “you
don’t just outsource, you devote 25% of the headcount to overseeing the outsourcing.” The
VP for clinical research at another company appeared to agree: “You still need internal
FTEs to ‘mind’ the CRO because they tend to go oﬀ track.” Of course, CRO teams resented
what they call “micro-management” by “control freaks” and the arrogance of buyers who
wanted them to adopt their own processes. To these objections one project manager replied
that micro-management was the only way they knew to “get the CRO’s attention.” Another
justiﬁed the intrusive brand of monitoring used by his ﬁrm in its interactions with CROs as
follows: “They’ve got us on guard because they are always trying to pull a fast one on us.”
Repeat business was a rare occurrence. All of the ﬁrms visited dealt with a very large
number of CROs (24 in one case), and acknowledged they were constantly changing suppliers,
even for projects pertaining to the same molecule. In the words of a clinical program manager:
“It depends on how badly they screwed up on the last project versus the costs involved in
16bringing a new CRO on board.” Another deplored: “We keep burning our bridges, going
through learning curves because we are never satisﬁed.”
The arms-length nature of buyer-supplier ties was colorfully described by a ﬁnancial
oﬃcer with overall responsibilities for contract negotiation. He explained:
“Our purchasing department uses a matrix where relationships can be described any-
where from a continuum that goes from ‘used-car salesman’ to ‘We’re married’ kind of
thing. For the used-car salesmen, we try to squeeze whatever we can out of the price,
and we don’t care if they go out of business, we do not care if they lose money, we
are just trying to get the best deal we can, and of course the other side of that is ‘We
are going to grow together, we are going to give you business, you are going to give us
better quality, faster, whatever.’ And we are more on the used-car salesman end of the
spectrum. I think that’s the case for most sponsors. I think that Merck and Pﬁzer are
even tougher with the CROs than we are. Gosh! We’re pretty tough on those guys, you
know.”
It is possible to cross-check the ﬁeld evidence with data from the sample of contracts
mentioned above. Following Uzzi (1996), I start by computing a Herﬁndahl index of spend-
ing concentration. The dollar share of each supplier in the portfolio of a given buyer is
computed, and the index is obtained by summing the squares of these shares, yielding a
number between 0 and 1. The mean Herﬁndahl index is 0.34, and the standard deviation
0.21 (the distribution is graphed in Figure 2). According to this traditional measure, on
average pharmaceutical ﬁrms maintain a network of exchange partners equivalent to the
structure that would obtain were they to split their spending equally across three CROs.
This seems at odds with the ﬁeld evidence, but the Herﬁndahl index suﬀers from a serious
shortcoming. For a number of pharmaceutical companies in the sample, there are relatively
few observed projects. This fact makes it diﬃcult to distinguish “true” spending concen-
tration (as a feature of buyers’ choice of suppliers) from lack of actual variation due to
insuﬃcient opportunity to observe contracts for a large number of projects. Companies that
conduct only a few trials will tend to exhibit high values of the Herﬁndahl, but that is not
necessarily indicative of genuine high concentration.
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Ellison-Glaeser index is –0.084 with a standard deviation of 0.137. Essentially, the distri-
bution is a spike centered at 0 (see Figure 3): When corrected for “fewness,” spending by
pharmaceutical ﬁrms in drug development appears just as concentrated as what one would
expect were these companies to sprinkle their spending according to the distribution of CRO
market shares.4
4.3 Rise and Fall of Preferred Provider Agreements
The respondents appeared to be acutely aware of the existence of more relational modes
of exchange in other industries. I discovered that some companies had endeavored to move
away from arms-length relationships, but these eﬀorts had uniformly ended in failure. During
the mid-1990s, the industry was abuzz with talks of “partnerships” between pharmaceutical
sponsors and CROs. The hazards of arms-length contracting were keenly felt by both buyers
and suppliers, and this led some ﬁrms to enter into long-term supply arrangements, so-called
“Preferred Provider Agreements” (PPAs). Three pharmaceutical companies in the sample
had recently experimented with such relationships, but I also relied on testimonies from CRO
employees to get a more complete picture.
While parties to PPAs felt the need to couch their shared understandings in a formal con-
tract, their initial dispositions appeared to have been consistent with the spirit of relational
4Unfortunately, comparable data pertaining to transactions between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and central
laboratories are not available.
18governance (Macaulay, 1963). The outsourcing manager of a pharmaceutical ﬁrm that had
entered into two PPAs in 1994 recalled:
“We wanted to get money out of the picture, because in the end it’s not the contract
that is the most important. So the deal was that we were not going to quibble, we would
pay whatever they were going to bill, and we would simply get a discount on their hourly
rates.”
In the words of a project manager at this ﬁrm:
“The goal was to tell companies to take a product from Phase II to Approval. That
means that they have X number of people dedicated to you. That was the goal. The
problems is that a Phase II will start and stop, start and stop until they ﬁnally ﬁgure
out what the drug does. When it stops, what do you do with these dedicated people?
This happened in one instance when drug supplies were unavailable for a long period.
We nearly called oﬀ the agreement, because you have to pay them to sit around and
do nothing. We used the preferred providers for two large projects. Moreover, a lot of
internal problems at one CRO had an impact on the work. The most knowledgeable
people left the ﬁrm, and quality went down. Billing became a nightmare with both
CROs. People were thinking that they should bill you when they think of you — like
lawyers. There were change orders all the time, and we just had no control. They were
asking us to predict 5 years ahead of time what their pipeline was going to look like.
We could not even do it with a ﬁve months time horizon! That was supposed to save
us money, but in the end that did not materialize.”
The CEO of a small CRO agreed that the idea behind PPAs was to select CROs “based
ﬁrst on cultural compatibility, second on therapeutic capabilities, and only third on price.” In
an account relatively consistent with that of buyers’, he went on to add that
“...in the end, it was just price. CROs discounted their prices to get into these agree-
ments. That meant they had no incentives to put their best people on these projects.
Moreover, there were some spectacular project cancellations, and nobody heard from
preferred providers ever since.”
In a large biotech ﬁrm who also experimented with PPAs (in this case formally struc-
tured as a ﬁve-year payment guarantee), the proximate factors leading to the demise of the
relationship are murkier. There, the agreement was negotiated by top management in ways
that antagonized clinical study teams and hampered the spirit of cooperation necessary for
the agreement to succeed:
19“We became very dissatisﬁed with the job they were doing. They did not really need our
business, because the CRO industry was growing so fast at that time. And our teams
did not want to select them. Moreover, new teams became involved, and the CRO did
not have the breadth of therapeutic expertise we needed.”
Of course, these quotes raise more questions than they answer. Why did CROs took ad-
vantage of these agreements when they could have been enticed to cooperate by the prospect
of repeat business? Why did clients use PPAs as a backdoor device to squeeze suppliers on
price? And why did they refrain from doing so with Central Labs? To answer these ques-
tions, I turn my attention to diﬀerences in the organization of work inside pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, Central Labs, and CROs.
5 Internal Firm Structure and the Embedding Process
The ﬁeldwork enables me to draw two diﬀerent comparisons. First, Central Labs’ in-
ternal labor markets can be evaluated against those of CROs. Second, CROs’ internal labor
markets can be contrasted with those of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, since there exists inside the
latter employees engaged in exactly the same activities as inside the former. I refer to “in-
ternal labor markets” not only in the traditional sense of hierarchical job ladders (Doeringer
and Piore, 1971), but also in a broader sense encompassing a company’s overall human re-
source strategy — wage policies, job classiﬁcations, and rules regarding the deployment of
labor and employment security.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms and Central Labs bore the hallmarks of the “posthierarchical work-
place” (Zuboﬀ, 1988) or “high-commitment organization” (Osterman, 1994) — a conception
of work reliant on a collective eﬀort conducted by self-managed teams of diverse skills,
working with considerable discretion, judged on results and outcomes (Powell, 2001). In
contrast, CROs provided a modern example of Taylorist organizations — detailed hierarchi-
cal divisions of labor with at their core employees focused on narrow and speciﬁc tasks and
a clear distinction between conception and execution. The former preserved and transferred
knowledge through extensive training within communities of practice (Barley, 1996) and had
adopted “high-performance” work practices designed to elicit greater employee involvement
20in the workplace (Pil and McDuﬃe, 1996); the latter used formal rules and procedures to
achieve coordination. The training manager at a large biotechnology company probably best
described the essence of the “transformed workplace” prevalent inside most pharmaceutical
ﬁrms:
“A team is worth many times more than any function. As long as that team is vibrant,
alive, and functioning, everything is ﬁne. If that team goes away, then team members
feel very lost... The role of the leader is to harmonize the inputs of diﬀerent people. A
lot of decisions are reached by consensus, e-mail, or corridors. The decision-making is
not as crisp or formalized in ways that you may ﬁnd at other companies. That often
means that taking decisions is a long process. But our approach is that decisions should
be taken at the lowest competent level.”
In interviews with clinical monitors inside pharmaceutical ﬁrms, the majority had had
earlier experiences working for a CRO. Revealingly, these ex-CRO employees used the term
“data mules” to refer to clinical monitors working for CROs. They reported having been
lightly trained and strenuously overworked (including travel four or ﬁve days a week). One
asserted: “When I was working for a CRO, I was there strictly to pay my dues so that I
could be hired by a pharmaceutical company.” A business development director at a mid-size
supplier concurred, conceding that
“Being a clinical monitor is not a lifetime career, it is a stepping stone to other jobs
in the pharmaceutical industry. In a pharma ﬁrm, employees get attached to a speciﬁc
product, or at least a speciﬁc therapeutic area; they develop a sense of ownership because
it is possible to see the development of a product from start to ﬁnish. If you work for
a CRO, you see a little piece of everybody’s pie, it is much less exciting.”
As a result, employees of pharmaceutical ﬁrms in similar roles tended to be older, more
experienced, and better trained. Career patterns diﬀered as well. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms
combined the horizontal division of labor characteristic of “functionally ﬂexible workplaces”
(Kalleberg, 2001) with lateral mobility that enabled employees to develop career trajectories
along vertical job ladders. The following anecdote, culled from my ﬁeld notes, best captures
the robustness of their internal labor markets. On my way to lunch during a site visit at
a large pharmaceutical ﬁrm, I stumbled across a large crowd assembled in the atrium for a
ceremony recognizing employees of the “Class of 1980.” I asked my host what the number
211980 referred to, and he replied in all seriousness that those employees had ﬁrst joined the
ﬁrm 20 years hence. I found revealing the fact that a large corporation would cultivate such
an institution; even more telling was that a large fraction of the employees who had joined
the ﬁrm that year were still employed there 20 years later. To be sure, my informants’
tenures were generally shorter at other ﬁrms, but they were invariably longer than those of
front-line CRO employees I conversed with. One outsourcing manager characterized CROs
as “high attrition workmills.” Complaints about monitor turnover became a mantra; the
topic invariably came up as an issue in my interviews:
“We had a project where we had 100% turnover” [VP Clinical Development]
“This turnover thing is going to kill them” [Clinical Operations Manager]
“It seems like it’s a revolving door!” [Project Manager]
My respondents inside CROs acknowledged that short tenures were the norm for all but
the most senior positions. For instance, the owner of a small CRO asserted that the annual
turnover rate in the industry is 25% to 30% on average. He added: “That is very high if you
think that most clinical trials last at least a year...It is a very competitive industry, nobody
can aﬀord to raise wages.” The rate of voluntary turnover for Central Lab employees was
much lower — 5% according to a large supplier’s sales manager. He further boasted, in an
obvious jibe at his CRO colleagues: “I’m not grooming people for [Eli] Lilly.”
The picture that emerges is one where weak internal labor markets for suppliers are
associated with arms-length ties between buyers and suppliers. Is this association spurious?
The mechanisms through which internal ﬁrm structure inﬂuences the embedding process are
explored below. Weak internal labor markets undermine embedded ties because of (1) their
exclusive reliance on “hard” measures of performance, (2) job designs inimical to teamwork,
and (3) the hierarchical constraints they put on information ﬂows.
Misaligned incentives. CROs earn their “sweatshop” reputation by using narrow metrics
of job performance to reward (and punish) individual employees. Project-level measures
of performance have two distinct eﬀects on the productivity of CRO teams. First, they
skew clinical monitors’ attention and eﬀort away from knowledge production towards data-
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employees in these terms:
“...There is a line-by-line deﬁnition of the CRO’s responsibilities. That means that the CRO
is less likely to notice stuﬀ that might be going on at the sites. There are no incentives for
the individuals at CROs for capturing ‘soft data’, unlike here, where you get rewarded at every
level. At a CRO, you might work for two or three sponsors at the same time. So it’s all about
hard deliverables. Anything beyond the contract you do not get.”
Second, what could be measured easily in the supplier’s hierarchy was often several steps
removed from what clients ultimately valued. In particular, CROs put great emphasis on
speed of execution for every task, partly because this could increase employees’ billable hours,
and partly because suppliers often suﬀered ﬁnancial penalties when they did not complete
projects on time. However, this emphasis could have unintended consequences. A project
manager provided the following example pertaining to the investigator selection process:
“...[Inside the CRO] it does not pay to be honest. The people doing the recruiting for CROs
do not have a clue. They do not understand medicine, so if a private doc tells them they are
going to recruit 24 patients, they will believe him, even though this is clearly ridiculous. For
the CROs, this is simply a numbers game. Site selection is done in a hurry. The employee
will simply say: ‘I recruited all the docs I needed today.’ It is all about meeting deadlines, even
though the sponsor may end up with the worst set of investigators.”
Unbalanced incentives (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991) and distortionary performance
measurement (Kerr, 1975; Baker, 1992) interfered with the embedding process because the
behavioral pathologies they created could not be mitigated at higher hierarchical levels. In
this respect, CROs diﬀer from the garment manufacturers studied by Uzzi (1997). These
suppliers are not known for their vibrant internal labor markets, but this need not hinder
the emergence of embedded ties as long as performance measures are not distortionary and
valuable ‘soft’ information resides at the top of the hierarchy.
Multiproject job designs. The organization of work diﬀered inside pharmaceutical ﬁrms
and CROs. A project manager at a CRO conﬁded that “in order to get the optimal utiliza-
tion, the pool of monitors needs to be common across therapeutic areas. Otherwise there are
silos of staﬀ and people are being under-utilized.” Indeed, CROs maximize short-run proﬁts
by keeping their employees fully “billable,” which often meant assigning them to multiple
23projects at a time, and shifting them laterally from project to project as the need arose.
In contrast, in-house monitors were generally assigned to a single project at a time, and
specialized therapeutically. Furthermore, assignment decisions took idiosyncratic expertise
into account. For example, if a monitor had worked on previous studies for a drug, he/she
was very likely to be assigned to the follow-on study as well. Inside central labs, employ-
ees worked on multiple projects, but staﬀ was organized in self-directed teams dedicated to
speciﬁc clients. The knowledge enabling eﬀective practice was distributed among employees,
and the subculture’s rules for accessing distributed expertise were an important ingredi-
ent of successful problem-solving strategies. Accordingly, single project/client assignments
contributed to preserve interpersonal relationships that made teamwork eﬀective (Jacoby,
1999; Gant et al., 2002). It also fostered a sense of identiﬁcation with the product under
development. In-house and CRO teams diﬀered in the extent to which they displayed what
practitioners called the “sense of project ownership.” A project manager described the state
of mind of CRO teams as follows:
“...once the trial is under way, your crisis is not theirs. You are probably more attached
to that product than they are. You are involved in all of it, but they only get this small
piece. They are not getting the full picture.”
At a large pharmaceutical ﬁrm, in-house clinical monitors specialized therapeutically,
except in the early stages of development, as it was felt that safety trials required expertise
that cut across therapeutic areas. A monitor in the early stage unit found emotionally
painful the need to “disinvest” molecules that had progressed past the initial safety hurdle
for which she was responsible:
“I am always wondering what has happened to compounds I have worked on and have
gone over to later development. It becomes part of you. That’s a year or two of your
life. It is a little bit unfortunate that you have to hand it over. Some of the people in
our group are actually transferring to the therapeutic areas to follow the compound...
The success of a compound reﬂects back on you and the work you do.”
Stilted communication channels. Weak internal labor markets are also characterized by
their emphasis on formal reporting mechanisms. When all communication must ﬂow through
24a rigid chain of command, ﬁne-grained local information, even if acquired by suppliers’ staﬀ,
is less likely to ﬁnd its way to the buyers’ employees who can use it most eﬀectively. In the
words of a project manager:
“The bigger the CRO, the more information gets ﬁltered before it reaches the sponsor... The
CRO is a business. They don’t have the time to develop a rapport with the staﬀ, the study
coordinator or the investigator, to elicit some of this [soft] information. They are there, they
are looking at the source documents, they are checking the CRFs, the regulatory binders, but
that’s all they do. The trip report is where we could get that kind of stuﬀ. But depending
on how you set up the project, they may call their supervisor who calls their supervisor, who
eventually calls the project manager. By then, the information is likely to be lost because they
do not have a sense of ownership for the project.”
This last quote highlights the overall goal conﬂict between buyers and suppliers. Inside
pharmaceutical ﬁrms, managers strive to produce all the information required to reach the
correct “go/no-go” decision for a particular drug, subject to a budget constraint which
includes “time costs” (i.e., foregone sales opportunities because the drug, whose patent clock
is ticking, lingers in development). Due to the severe penalties for late performance contained
in many outsourcing contracts, CRO managers focus instead on time-to-project completion
(subject to the constraint that data quality had to exceed some minimum standard). This
lack of congruence between managers’ objectives on either side of ﬁrm boundaries reinforced
work behaviors among CRO employees that reduced the overall attractiveness of relational
governance while increasing opportunities for conﬂict between exchange partners. Most
saliently, employees engaged in “chunking,” whereby each task was partitioned in ways that
improved measurable performance within tasks at the expense of a soft-handover between
tasks. In the words of a frustrated clinical operations manager at a major biotech ﬁrm:
“Think of the various steps that are needed from protocol development, site initiation,
enrollment, data collection, database lock, analysis, and ﬁnal study report. The way
CROs do this is: you ﬁnish one, then you start the next one, then you start the next
one, etc. This mentality, while it is great to make sure that you are charging people
the right amount of money, that you can defend your position, it’s a killer in drug
development. Within site initiation, there may be about eight processes that go on.
Come up with a template questionnaire, come up with a template contract, come up
with a consent form, etc. They do not do all of these processes concurrently. They like
to do one, ﬁnish it, then start the next one.”
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maceutical ﬁrms are both a cause and a consequence of weak internal labor markets within
suppliers. Chunking reﬂected suppliers’ obsession with narrow and measurable measures of
job performance, but the practice was also reinforced by the structure of outsourcing con-
tracts; and this structure was itself an expression of the transactional orientation prevailing
between buyers and suppliers. The ﬁnancial oﬃcer of a mid-sized pharmaceutical ﬁrm re-
counted his ﬁrm’s initial experience with “time and materials” contracts. Such cost-plus
contracts had the virtue that they did not create incentives for suppliers to skimp on quality.
However, they created opportunities for CROs to “lowball” their bids and overcharge clients
later for “scope changes.” As a response to these pathologies, the ﬁrm had adopted so-called
ﬁxed-units contracts. The tasks to be performed by the supplier were broken down to a very
detailed level (some contracts included more than 200 items), and each unit was then priced
independently. According to this manager, the results had been dramatic:
“When we realized T&M was nuts, [Consulting Firm X] came up with what they call
ﬁxed-unit pricing that says: ‘show me deliverables.’ What I want to pay for is a mon-
itoring visit, a case report form entered, a statistical analysis. And you assign a price
for each of these units. Now the CRO says ‘This month I did the following things for
you’ and now our clinical people can say ‘Yeah, they entered a thousand pages, yeah
they cleaned 500 pages.’ I know what I got for my money. The CROs are completely
held accountable. It’s a great system for them to bid properly, and now they must run
an eﬃcient shop.”
This contractual innovation eﬀectively rid buyer-supplier relationships of the problem of
insincere bidding strategies and artiﬁcial scope changes, but played right into CRO employ-
ees’ predilection for chunking. Since the costs induced by chunking were less transparent
and more diﬀused than those caused by scope changes, ﬁxed-unit contracts had been broadly
adopted in the industry. Front-line personnel, however, were under no illusion that tinker-
ing with the structure of formal contractual arrangements could change the nature of these
supply relationships.
What the evidence above supports is not so much the idea that weak internal labor
markets “cause” embedded ties to fail than the idea of organizational complementarities:
arms-length contracting between ﬁrms raises suppliers’ returns to structuring the employ-
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to adopt relational modes of exchange. This vicious circle results from a self-fulﬁlling failure
of expectations. Before discussing this idea in more depth, two questions arise. First, if out-
sourcing the coordination of clinical trials is so ineﬃcient, why is the practice so prevalent?
Second, why have pharmaceutical ﬁrms and CROs failed to change this conﬁguration of re-
lationships to adopt the more successful conﬁguration that prevails between pharmaceutical
ﬁrms and central labs?
6 Clinical Development Outsourcing in the Shadow of
the Future
In addition to job ladders, new structuralist accounts of the labor market emphasize the
importance of psychological contracts — perceptions regarding mutual obligations between
employers and employees — as a source of employee motivation (Baron, 1984; Rousseau,
1995). External changes such as globalization and deregulation are often alleged to have
undermined the standard employment relationship in which job security was exchanged for
loyalty (Cappelli, 1999; Neumark, 2000). Yet, shared expectations of continued employment
are also found inside “posthierachical workplaces,” since the successful adoption of high-
performance work practices presupposes the ongoing consent of front-line employees, and
this consent is unlikely to be forthcoming if their working lives unfold in the shadow of
downsizing. This poses an important challenge for ﬁrms operating in fast-paced, knowledge-
intensive industries. On the one hand, an employment relationship reduced to its formal
and transactional aspects is likely to hamper ﬁrms in these environments as they strive
to reduce cycle times and increase productivity. On the other hand, the uncertainty that
is characteristic of product and labor markets in technology-intensive industries makes it
diﬃcult for ﬁrms to commit to long-term employment. This dilemma is particularly salient
in clinical development. Drugs enter and exit the pipeline early and often, creating wide
variation in the number of employees needed to staﬀ the development functions within the
ﬁrm (Azoulay, 2003b).
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precisely to handle this variability. By buﬀering a core of insiders with a periphery of
contractors bearing the brunt of workload adjustment, the ﬁrm lifts the shadow of downsizing
from before the eyes of its staﬀ, credibly signaling its intention to deliver on a promise of job
stability. As a result, insiders were more likely to engage in the kind of behaviors conducive to
the creation of speciﬁc knowledge. The use of outsourcing as a buﬀering mechanism probably
explains why senior managers displayed an overt bias in favor of internal teams: “If resources
were not an issue, we would never outsource” captures the spirit of comments often heard
at the highest echelons of pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ clinical development operations.5 Since
resources were an issue — hiring and ﬁring insiders to follow the vagaries of the development
pipeline was not viewed as a viable option — pharmaceutical ﬁrms used outsourcing as a
commitment device to their own staﬀ. This idea was articulated, in one form or another,
by at least one manager in every ﬁrm I visited. The argument also resonated with in-
house monitors — the beneﬁciaries of this unusual insurance mechanism. Below are two
representative quotes:
“...if you hire somebody here, you hire him for 40 years, and you have to give him
work for 40 years. Otherwise you may lose the team esprit-de-corps. People here are
incredibly committed. You see them doing heroic acts to support the team. Even if we
did not think about it that way initially, outsourcing helps maintain continuity for our
own people.” [Training Manager]
Or: “I would hate working for a CRO. They really have to be worried and keep everyone
on their staﬀ busy. But that’s precisely why you hire a CRO — because you do not
want to lay oﬀ half your staﬀ if an indication is canceled...” [Junior Clinical Monitor]
Of course, suppliers understand perfectly that “the essence of a CRO contract is that
in 30 days, you can be out of here” (in the words of an outsourcing manager at a large
biotech ﬁrm). Moreover, buyers are aware that they are in part responsible for the lack of
cooperation on the part of CROs:
5This stands in contrast with Eccles and White’s evidence on transfer-pricing arrangements within mul-
tidivisional ﬁrms, where the conﬂict between internal and external supply is used to elicit cost information
that would remain buried inside the organization in the absence of conﬂict over supply sources (Eccles and
White, 1988).
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and growing the pie over time. At the end of the day, we want to be able to ﬁre them
when we don’t need them. That’s the primary thing we want. Although we have a
scale-down process as part of our contracts, it is very limited.” [Outsourcing Manager]
The sales director of a large CRO concurred: “Because we have low expectation of repeat
business, we are reluctant to commit teams to particular clients.” Added another:
“Contracts have a 60/90 days cancellation clause. So we assume a lot of risk. We
are mindful of it, and that has an impact on contract negotiations. Relationships can
actually hurt you in this business.”
In light of this evidence, the eﬀorts devoted to engineer embeddedness between buyers and
suppliers appear somewhat quixotic. Besides CROs’ buﬀering function, additional hurdles
hampered the emergence of embedded ties in clinical development.
The Failure of Generalized Reputations. Embedded ties between CROs and pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms might embody a qui-pro-quo of the following form: “If you go beyond the
letter of the contract and choose to dedicate staﬀ to our projects, then we will award your
ﬁrm more contracts in the future.” Unfortunately, buyers and suppliers face large tempta-
tions to renege on such an implicit contract. For example, if the pipeline suddenly dries up
following the simultaneous failure of a few experimental compounds (a common occurrence),
then the pharmaceutical ﬁrm will rely on its core of insiders to handle the remaining demand
for clinical services. Fully aware of this fact, the CRO will often renege on its promise to
dedicate staﬀ if a more proﬁtable assignment opportunity arises for some of its employees.
Because the shadow of the future does not loom large enough, the cooperative outcome does
not materialize; buyers and suppliers revert to ineﬃcient spot outsourcing contracts.
This dilemma does not arise with Central Labs. Not only is there no source of internal
supply, but in addition there is less uncertainty regarding the future value of suppliers’
speciﬁc investments, as the locus of speciﬁcity tends to be at the client level, unlike the case
of clinical services where the project- and drug- level is more relevant. Since the probability
of failure for a particular client is much lower than the probability of failure for a particular
29drug, informal promises of repeat business conditional on good supplier behavior are more
credible than in the clinical development setting. At a large biotech ﬁrm, an outsourcing
manager contrasted partnerships with CROs and Central Labs in the following terms:
“We are talking outsourcing programs as opposed to studies — although we will not
guarantee anything. But we could share with them what’s in our pipeline. What is the
workload coming in the next six months? Are they willing to dedicate quality people
to our programs? The deal is that we will commit to continue to use them if their
performance rises to our expectations. That has worked with Central Labs. We get
dedicated program managers that are ahead of the curve. Service level has gone up,
costs have gone down, and they are getting more business. But the labs are in a much
less risky position than the CROs.”
However, the failure of bilateral reputation mechanisms cannot by itself explain the dearth
of embedded ties. Recent theoretical work in economics and sociology has demonstrated that
changing partners itself is unimportant; the crux of the matter is information transmission
among exchange partners about past behavior (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Kandori, 1992;
Bendor and Swistak, 2001). At ﬁrst glance, there would appear to be scope for eﬀective
multilateral enforcement in addition to unilateral sanctions (e.g., a buyer deciding not to
award future contracts to a CRO at any point in the future). For instance, a pharmaceutical
ﬁrm could attempt to ruin the reputation of a particular CRO by communicating its poor
record to other pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Industry groups such as the Pharmaceutical Outsourc-
ing Managers Association could provide the appropriate conduit for such information. In
practice, punishments of defectors by the “community” of pharmaceutical ﬁrms was diﬃcult
because high turnover inside CROs undermined the informativeness of past performance
records. This idea is encapsulated in a piece of industry wisdom often heard during the
ﬁeld work: “A CRO is only as good as its last contract.” To justify this dictum, a project
manager explained:
“We have not had examples of enduring good matches — mostly because CRO peo-
ple turn over so quickly. Sometimes, with a single vendor who handles two projects
simultaneously, the ﬁrst one is a huge success, the second one is a horror story.”
While the observed correlation between the shadow of the future and the extent of inter-
ﬁrm cooperation is consistent with standard repeated-game arguments, understanding the
30mechanism leading to the breakdown of relational governance requires opening the black
box of internal organization, and acknowledging the distinction between the reputation of
individual agents and that of their organization’s.
In summary, the absence of “partnerships” so often deplored by buyers and suppliers
cannot be understood in isolation from other contractual arrangements, both implicit and
explicit, within these same ﬁrms. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ internal labor markets would prob-
ably be less vibrant in the absence of the buﬀer provided by seemingly ineﬃcient spot
outsourcing contracts with CROs. Furthermore, buyers could and did mitigate the ineﬃ-
ciency of arms-length ties by allocating to external teams projects for which they expected
misaligned incentives, stilted communication ﬂows, and multi-project assignment to be less
damaging (Azoulay, 2003a).
7 Discussion
Many of the features of the complex environment in which buyers and suppliers evolve
are determined simultaneously. The failure of embedded ties in clinical development should
be viewed not as the result of some fundamental economic parameter or the reﬂection of some
underlying socio-cultural values, but as an interacting “equilibrium” that hangs together,
precipitated by expectational inertia (Greif, 1998). For instance, one might believe that
arms-length ties between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and CROs are justiﬁed in light of the fact that
routine projects tend to be allocated to CRO teams. But if clinical development outsourcing
deals were more akin to embedded relationships, one would expect the allocation of projects
between inside and outside teams to change as well. In particular, it would become less
costly to outsource knowledge-intensive projects to CROs.
Similarly, one might explain the dearth of embedded relationships by appealing to CROs’
high turnover rate. The evidence presented above suggests that this view is misguided.
If embedded relationships existed, there would be opportunities for diﬀerentiation on the
basis of quality in the clinical services industry, suppliers would be in a position to extract
31economic rents, pay employees above-market wages, and retain them more eﬀectively. This
would further buttress “hand-in-glove” supply relationships. The allocation of talent within
buyers and suppliers, the extent of reliance on a buﬀer of external teams, and the degree of
competition in the upstream sectors are likewise endogenous variables, and should not be
misconstrued as independent levers under the control of exchange partners. Figures 4 and 5
provide summary schemas of the constellation of relationships for the two settings studied
in this paper.
An alternative interpretation is that variation in pre-existing social ties between em-
ployees on both sides of organizational boundaries accounts for the contrasting patterns in
supply relationships I observed. Previous organizational research often describes embedded
business relationships superimposed on a preexisting network of family, ethnic, or friendship
ties (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Uzzi, 1997; Ingram and Roberts, 2000). There is more to
embeddedness than interpersonal aﬀect, however, since social relationships appear to play a
greater role in structuring exchange when anticipated economic beneﬁts are relatively high
(Zhou et al., 2003; Ingram and Lifschitz, 2003). In comparison with the settings that have
been the focus of past research, supply relationships in drug development were probably less
imbued with social meaning overall. Furthermore, social contexts were very similar across
the two settings. For example, the extent of friendship ties between buyers’ and suppliers’
employees did not appear to vary signiﬁcantly. As well, employees of CROs and Central
Labs were drawn from closely-related, non-professional labor markets. With one foot in
the material world and the other in a world of representations, both categories shared the
characteristics of technical occupations vividly described by Barley (1996). Of course, this
lack of variation also means that the evidence presented above cannot be used to adjudicate
claims regarding the relative importance of the “shadow of the past” and the “shadow of the
future” for the ability of economic actors to sustain cooperative outcomes.
I examine three alternative constellations of relationships to organize exchange: dual
internal labor markets, portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships, and “discrete” outsourcing.
None of these arrangements were actually observed during the ﬁeldwork. I use the available
evidence to speculate on the reasons for this lack of institutional variation.
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of “peripheral” employees subject to diﬀerent rules than those applied to the core labor force?
Such dual internal labor markets — in which outsiders are conﬁned to a separate division
within the same legal entity — are inherently unstable. Courts may not grant ﬁrms the right
to apply diﬀerent termination policies to workers sharing the same narrow job description,
even if actual job requirements diﬀer substantially between the two categories of employees.
This institutional constraint has become increasingly binding over time in the United States,
where the “employment-at-will” doctrine has been undermined by state courts (Autor, 2001).
There exists a deeper reason conﬁning the periphery outside of organizational boundaries:
equity norms may cause two-tiered internal labor markets to perform poorly, especially in
team-production settings (Lazear, 1989; Baron and Pfeﬀer, 1994).
A comparison between CRO employees and so called “freelance monitors” provides ad-
ditional insights on the feasibility of dual internal labor markets. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms used
independent contractors for reasons unrelated to buﬀering and the need to adjust the size
of the labor pool in the face of pipeline uncertainty. Freelancers were highly-skilled profes-
sionals who frequently monitored multiple studies for the same ﬁrm, and were assigned to
projects for which they possessed speciﬁc expertise. One manager in charge of a network of
regional monitors asserted:
“CRO employees are generally the least involved, the least interested, and the most
task-oriented. They don’t add much value. The independent is an interesting animal
because they tend to be far more experienced than even our own employees. They’ve
seen so much that they are able to smell something ﬁshy from miles apart.”
Independent monitors diﬀered from CRO employees in two essential respects. First, like
the IT professionals studied by Kunda et al. (2002), they had chosen self-employment. Sec-
ond, their independent status removed a layer of agency between the ﬁrm and the employee.
As a result, clients could assign freelancers to projects as they saw ﬁt, and this ability ef-
fectively brought contractors within the reach of pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ incentive systems.
For legal reasons, client ﬁrms were weary of commingling their own workforce with skilled
contractors, and as a result had endeavored to create artiﬁcial barriers separating perma-
33nent from contingent employees. These barriers could be either physical (deploying monitors
on a regional basis with minimal presence in the ﬁrm’s central location) or administrative
(contracting with specialized agencies).
Portfolio of buyer-supplier relationships. Another possibility would be for pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms to sort their suppliers into diﬀerent tiers, with the outer tiers being aﬀorded less
insurance against pipeline shocks than “ﬁrst tier” suppliers. This pattern has been observed
in other industries, most notably in the Japanese automobile manufacturing (Ansanuma
and Kikutani, 1992; Bensaou, 1999). Uzzi (1996) also documents a plurality of ties between
buyers and suppliers in the New York better dress industry, with only a handful of embed-
ded relationships within the portfolio of any given buyer. However, in these examples the
existence of an internal supplier is not discussed.
Among the six ﬁrms I visited, I found only one isolated instance of a relationship with
a particular CRO that could be characterized as “hand-in-glove.” Interestingly, this ﬁrm is
the same that had tried (and failed) to implement preferred provider agreements with two
large CROs. While the former approach could be characterized as “embeddedness from the
top-down,” the special relationship this large ﬁrm enjoyed with this small CRO would ﬁt
better under the label “embeddedness from the bottom-up.” A manager in charge of the
company’s training facilities told me that
“CRO X got its ﬁrst contract with us in 1995. Ever since, they’ve done 32 projects.
They dedicate a team to the compound. The only way that the team gets broken up is if
a person leaves the company. That makes us more committed to the relationship. We
would need to strengthen it, but we’ve been burned by the PPAs and we told them that
we are not making commitments anymore. This is like a PPA without the legalese, and
it was not negotiated at the VP level, which actually kills the partnership.”
However, these accomplishments appeared very fragile. This ﬁrm’s outsourcing manager
challenged the assertion that the relationship of his company with CRO X was substantially
diﬀerent from the relationships it entertained with other CROs:
“CRO X is not that phenomenal, they are really nothing special. We get along with
them, they are a nice CRO, but it’s a crapshoot. On the next study they could be
34terrible. You just don’t know, there is no long term trust in this business. If you
hit something that looks like a good match, you are going to continue — until they
underperform. Then you reset the counter to 0.”
In drug development, the proposition that the largest ﬁrms could provide some insurance
against pipeline shocks to a narrow set of carefully-selected suppliers has some face validity.
However, it is possible that conditional on retaining a core of insiders, no ﬁrm is large enough
to provide this kind of insurance to suppliers, given the amount of uncertainty involved in
clinical trials.
Discrete Outsourcing. So far, the discussion of clinical development outsourcing has taken
the existence of a core of insiders inside pharmaceutical ﬁrms as given, but in discussing
alternative governance regimes, it is useful to relax this assumption. Why do these ﬁrms not
fully devolve the coordination of clinical studies onto a few CROs, with whom they could
develop embedded ties? This possibility can be most fruitfully explored by focusing on the
experience of start-ups. These ﬁrms should be less constrained by their core of insiders than
established pharmaceutical ﬁrms. In the sample, only one ﬁrm could be considered small
enough to qualify as a start-up (as it had not brought to completion the development of any
product as of July 2000). I found no diﬀerences in the relationships of this ﬁrm with CROs
compared to those of larger ﬁrms. The outsourcing manager rationalized this situation by
reasoning that his company was too small for the perspective of repeat business to provide
incentives for contractual performance, as suppliers were aware that a reasonable chance
existed that the ﬁrm might not be in business in the future. As a result, this ﬁrm was fast
developing in-house clinical capabilities, hiring its own staﬀ to oversee and monitor clinical
trials.
8 Conclusion
I have set out to achieve two goals: to characterize the nature of buyer-supplier relation-
ships in drug development, and to identify the major social and organizational impediments
to the emergence of embedded supply relationships. Using qualitative methods, the study
35contributes a number of ﬁndings that hold signiﬁcance for the study of interorganizational
networks.
In order to explain why economic actors often fail to structure exchange in networks, past
research has emphasized the hazards of “overembeddedness” (Uzzi, 1996) and the diﬃculties
involved in engineering relationships in the absence of a pre-existing network of ethnic,
family, or friendship ties (Ingram and Roberts, 2000). While acknowledging the merits of
these explanations, I focus on the structure of constituent ﬁrms’ internal labor markets and
show how the nature of the employment relationship powerfully shapes and constrains the
scope of interorganizational networks. In particular, weak internal labor markets hinder the
embedding process by misaligning incentives, stultifying rich information ﬂows, and fostering
job designs inimical to teamwork.
The paper also provides a re-interpretation of recent structuralist accounts of the labor
market (Kalleberg, 2001; Cappelli and Neumark, 2002). Outsourcing “non-core” activities
while relying less on shared expectations of continued employment is often thought to be
antinomic with the adoption of high-involvement work practices, which presume employ-
ees’ ongoing decision-making involvement. The analysis above suggests that these practices
might be instead mutually reinforcing: In fast-paced product markets, partial outsourcing
using seemingly ineﬃcient spot contracts might provide the necessary stability required for
horizontal divisions of labor to thrive; in such settings, embeddedness within ﬁrms might
come at the expense of embeddedness between ﬁrms.
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* The schema depicts typical organizational arrangements in clinical development. A pharmaceutical firm (whose 
boundary is drawn using the thick solid line) is concurrently developing three drugs, using three distinct cross-functional 
product teams (whose boundaries are drawn using the thin dotted line). The box corresponding to team #1 has been 
blown up, revealing the different functions necessary to the successful development of drug #1.  For each drug, there is 
a portfolio of trials (three in the case of drug #1, two of which — trial #2 and trial #3 — are outsourced to two 
different CROs). The clinical monitors (both inside the pharmaceutical firm and the CROs) oversee the gathering of 
clinical data that takes place in a variety of clinical sites (hospitals, private clinics, Academic Medical Centers) under 
the stewardship of clinical investigators. These clinical investigators send patient samples to a central laboratory, which 
processes them and sends back the results to the project team.   44
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**  The calculations draw on a dataset of 1,423 CRO contracts from 61 large pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. Twice a year since 1991, FastTrack, Inc. has gathered data from subscribing companies. Like Uzzi (1996), 
the data provide good information at the “buyer-supplier match” level of analysis.   45
Figure 4: The Relational Architecture of Governance 
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Size in sales: small=$0-100 million; medium=$100-3,000 million; large=$3-50 billion. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of cross-site ethnographic evidence for impediments to 
embedded supply relationships in six pharmaceutical and biotech firms 
  CROs Central  Labs 
Employees are “data mules”  10   
There are benefits to “Partnerships”  8  5 
Outsourcing is purely tactical (i.e., we only have arms-length ties)  22 1 
There are learning curves (i.e., specific human capital is important)  5 4 
Outsourcing in an insurance policy for our own employees  11   
We need to constantly monitoring the suppliers and their employees  13  2 
We may lose the soft data  15  1 
We outsource selectively  11   
Teams have a lot of turnover  13   
You are as good as your last project (i.e., no generalized reputations)  6 1 
We got burned with “Preferred Provider Agreements”  8   
If resources were not an issue, we would not outsource  4   
Numbers in cells represent frequency of responses by interviewees aggregated across person-cases. Empty cells indicate 
that no responses were made by interviewees in that category.   47
Appendix: 
Open-ended Interview Items 
 
The items listed below do not constitute an exhaustive list of the questions asked during the ethnographic 
fieldwork, but provide a sense of how the statements reported  in the text were elicited. 
 
Internal Organization 
Tell me what's involved with monitoring. Have you done it for other companies than [Firm X]? 
How are clinical monitors recruited and trained? How are monitors evaluated? How is their job performance 
tracked? 
Is monitor turnover an issue for your firm? Is this turnover internal (i.e. promotion), or external? 
How much therapeutic specialization is there for monitors? 
What kind of incentives do you provide to monitors? What are possible promotion paths for in-house 
monitors? 
How many monitors are working here? Are they permanent employees? Are there also temps, or contract 
monitors? 
How is project management organized? Who are the project managers? What are their background? 
 
Interfirm Contracts 
Why do you outsource? 
Is there a firm-wide outsourcing policy or is the decision taken on a project-specific basis? 
Who owns the data? Who owns the molecule? 
How did outsourcing start in your company? How long ago? What was the initial event that triggered 
adoption of outsourcing? 
What services exactly are being outsourced? How are CROs/Central Labs selected? 
How important is therapeutic expertise? How are contracts drafted? How has it changed over time? 
Are the incentives built in the contracts for speed, quality, or both?  
Could you walk me through the financial negotiation with a CRO/Central Lab? Is price the most 
determinant characteristic of a bid? How many bids are received on average? 
When you deal with a CRO/Central Lab repeatedly and are happy about their performance, do you expect 
them to give you a lower price? 
 
Buyer-Supplier Interactions 
How many CROs/Central Labs is your company dealing with? 
How frequent is repeat business with CROs? With Central Labs? Why? 
Do you ever hang out with your counterparts at the CRO/Central Lab after work? 
How are CROs/Central Labs monitored and evaluated? 
How does one deal with changes and renegotiation as the trial proceeds? 
Who makes the determination of whether the CRO or [Firm X] must pay for scope changes?  
 
Relationship Outcomes 
Do you have Preferred Provider Agreements? How easy/hard is it to have long-term “hand-in-glove” 
relationships with CROs/Central Labs? Why? What are the benefits of such relationships? What are the 
drawbacks? 
Do CROs/Central Labs have reputations? How do you learn about the quality of different CROs? 
 
 